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Abstract— Cyber-physical systems, especially in critical infra-
structures, have become primary hacking targets in international 
conflicts and diplomacy. However, cyber-physical systems present 
unique challenges to defenders, starting with an inability to com-
municate. This paper outlines the results of our interviews with 
information technology (IT) defenders and operational technology 
(OT) operators and seeks to address lessons learned from them in 
the structure of our notional solutions. We present two problems 
in this paper: (1) the difficulty of coordinating detection and re-
sponse between defenders who work on the cyber/IT and physi-
cal/OT sides of cyber-physical infrastructures, and (2) the 
difficulty of estimating the safety state of a cyber-physical system 
while an intrusion is underway but before damage can be effected 
by the attacker. To meet these challenges, we propose two solu-
tions: (1) a visualization that will enable communication between 
IT defenders and OT operators, and (2) a machine-learning ap-
proach that will estimate the distance from normal the physical 
system is operating and send information to the visualization.  
Keywords—Cyberphysical systems, CPS, Internet of Things, 
IoT, visualization, machine learning, deep learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For years the NSA and FBI have been publicly warning 
utility owners that cyber attacks on their physical infrastructures 
were imminent [1].  In December of 2015 and 2016 the world 
saw the first major manifestation of the cyber vulnerability of 
infrastructural cyber-physical systems as Ukraine's electric grid 
was repeatedly attacked, resulting in a quarter million 
Ukrainians going without power in winter temperatures [2].  
More recently, the VPNFilter malware was noted to have the 
capability to monitor devices on control-systems networks [3].  
Networked computer systems have become an attack vector for 
cyber-physical infrastructures that can produce severe physical 
and political effects. However, meeting this threat requires co-
ordinating defenses between cyber security staff and physical 
plant operators. Human effectiveness is a challenge for cyber-
physical systems (CPS) security, but human influence adds both 
resilience and complexity to cyber-physical systems.  Research 
is required to enable the needed collaboration.   
We present two problems in this paper and two matching so-
lutions. The first problem is the difficulty of coordinating detec-
tion and response between defenders who work on the cyber 
(Information Technology, IT) and physical (Operational Tech-
nology, OT) sides of infrastructures. The proposed matching so-
lution is a visualization that will enable communication between 
IT defenders and OT operators. The second problem is the dif-
ficulty of estimating the safety state of a cyber-physical system 
while an intrusion is underway but before the attacker can do 
damage. The proposed solution is a machine-learning approach 
that will estimate the distance from normal the physical system 
is operating and send information to the visualization. This work 
outlines the results of our interviews with IT defenders and OT 
operators and seeks to address lessons learned from them in the 
structure of our notional solutions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The United States President’s National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) defines 
CPS as follows: 
Decentralized network of objects (or devices), 
applications, and services that can sense, log, interpret, 
communicate, process, and act on a variety of information 
or control devices in the physical environment.  These 
devices range from small sensors on consumer devices to 
sophisticated computers in industrial control systems 
(ICS).  Ultimately, the devices have some type of kinetic 
impact on the physical world, whether directly or through 
a mechanical device to which they are connected [4]. 
Protecting OT/CPS in critical infrastructures is a principle 
concern for any nation. Cyber weapons may be as lethal to in-
frastructures as kinetic warfare, and, as Stuxnet demonstrated, 
not even air-gapped systems are safe [5]. Software-borne 
weapons in embedded systems may stay dormant or subtly 
active for months or years as the remote attackers wait for the 
right moment to attack.  Detection of attacks from the physical 
side alone may be very difficult, and once attackers gain access 
to a control system they may cause a variety of distracting 
problems.  There are five stages the attacker goes through when 
hacking a complex cyber-physical control system [6]: 
1. Access: gained through traditional hacking approaches 
2. Discovery: determining the unique physical and logical 
functions of the victim system 
3. Control: learning the limits of control available via soft-
ware 
4. Damage: deciding on and producing the kinds of damage 
he or she would like to inflict, and finally 
5. Cleanup: causing the operators to believe what the at-
tacker wants them to believe about the attack. 
The access phase presents the best hope for discovering 
attackers in cyber-physical systems from the cyber side.  From 
the physical side, noting anomalies during the discovery and 
control phases is the most likely way to stop an attack before 
damage occurs.  The discovery and control phases may require 
months or years of development after initial access is gained 
before noticeable damage may be inflicted.  Thus, unless 
attackers are caught during the discovery and control phases, 
correlating the attack activities back to the cyber indicators of 
the access phase may be very difficult for the defenders. 
Detection of attacks from the cyber side is difficult because, 
typically, cyber operators do not understand the protocols, 
physical processes, or potential consequences of attacks on the 
physical system.  Even when defenders detect attackers gaining 
access, it is difficult to understand the ultimate goal of attacks or 
to determine whether the attackers have achieved their purposes.  
Similarly, the cyber side has complexities not well understood 
by the control-systems operators.  Both groups of operators need 
to understand previous cyber attacks so they can understand 
potential risks to the physical plant in the future.  
A. Welcome to XYZ, Corp. 
For our study, we refer to network configurations and secu-
rity conditions at a fictitious company, XYZ Corp., that is made 
of a conglomeration of real companies from whose systems, net-
works, and operators we gathered information. Fig. 1 shows the 
basic network setup of XYZ Corp. 
 
Fig. 1. XYZ Corporation IT/OT Network. 
As shown in the figure, XYZ’s network is divided into a 
corporate Local Area Network (LAN), a demilitarized zone 
(DMZ), and an ICS network (which XYZ Corp. calls the facili-
ties network). Each zone is cordoned off from the others and 
from the internet via a firewall and access-control rules. Con-
trolled remote access allows the site to collect data from rented 
facilities that have their own networks and allows collaborators 
authenticated access to data and OT systems.  
Ideally, there would be only a single, tightly controlled 
connection between the corporate LAN and the control systems 
LAN.  However, there may be many access points (some of 
which cross air gaps) implying inconsistent access controls and 
multiple paths for an attacker to target.  Systems on the corporate 
LAN need occasional access to systems on the facilities network 
for control/status and to perform updates.  Even air gaps must be 
considered high-latency internet connections. 
At XYZ, the cyber-physical systems in the facilities network 
are generally composed of remote telemetry units (RTUs), 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs), and the sensors and actuators that control and 
read from the physical devices. We collectively refer to these as 
control systems devices or controllers. There is also a set of IT 
servers that collect and provide access to the data from the con-
trollers, and human-machine interface (HMI) devices that ena-
ble a command and status channel to the human operators.   
As control systems devices increase in computational and 
networking capabilities, they become more susceptible to cyber 
attack. They are designed for long life without updates.  
Unfortunately, this means that once an exploit is discovered for 
a controller, it may be vulnerable for life.  These components are 
not designed to manage their own security and they simply 
accept and run any command or firmware update they receive.  
Thus, attackers can surreptitiously re-image devices.  
Discovering this duplicity and repairing the damage it causes 
can be an extremely complex matter.  
Cyber-physical systems at XYZ include HVAC and building 
control and automation for lab spaces, air flow handlers, 
scientific instruments, and more.  There are an estimated 20,000 
addressable networked devices at XYZ Corp. involved in cyber-
physical systems, but the breakdown into classes is unknown.  
Perhaps one-quarter (5,000 addresses) belong to actual physical 
devices and to associated research equipment.  Several of XYZ’s 
newest buildings publish sensor information to the corporate 
network as to help bring operational CPS data to researchers. 
Every control system is a unique combination of sensors, 
actuators, controllers, and computers connected by excessively 
many semi-interoperable proprietary protocols.  OT staff 
specialize in knowing the idiosyncrasies of these highly diverse 
systems and their protocols. Today's OT systems are process-
based; they do not do detection based on the information content 
of the network traffic, and there is little commercial impetus to 
do so.  Frequent errors are generally tolerated if they do not 
produce downtime.  Error that do not produce downtime are sel-
dom investigated, and no logs of commands sent to devices are 
kept.  None of these systems are deemed critical from an IT per-
spective, so logging seems to be an unnecessary expense. 
Little or no security is included in OT protocols.  For 
instance, Modbus protocol simply provides a way to write to and 
read from devices without any notion of authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, or authorization.  Encryption and 
authentication protocols require costly key management 
processes, and it is more cost effective to simply cordon these 
systems off on a secured network.  This is efficiency, not bad 
design.  But newer devices on facilities networks may have 
uncontrolled cellular connectivity to the Internet. When control 
systems are unintentionally exposed to the broader threat-space 
of the internet, problems may arise.  
Generally, OT devices that have serial-only connections are 
grouped into a “field bus” network under a Network Area 
Controller (NAC) device connected to an Ethernet network via 
TCP/IP.  Native-protocol commands for the devices on the field 
bus are tunneled though TCP/IP and passed on to the proper 
device by the NAC.  Typically, no syntactic or semantic 
validation or stateful inspection of the tunneled commands is 
done because this would require expensive emulation of all the 
types of devices on the NAC.  At XYZ, the NAC's primary 
security control is its isolation of the facilities network.  The 
NAC uses a firewall that logs and controls its access from the 
XYZ network. 
Some cyber-physical systems use Windows-based 
controllers, and many of these systems at XYZ Corp. have 
Windows Logging Service (WLS) installed.  WLS takes 
information from the native Microsoft Windows log events, 
correlates security and resource usage information to it, and 
repackages it in XML in a key/value format like what the Unix 
syslog facility provides.  WLS data would provide the most 
comprehensive set of host-based data for the traditional IT 
systems found within OT networks.  However, the actual 
controllers (PLCs/RTUs/etc.) do not run Windows.  Instead they 
may run some completely custom application without an 
operating system as is done on Application-Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASICs). For them, security software is not an option. 
Some XYZ buildings are leased facilities where the cyber-
physical building systems are on a private network, owned and 
secured by the building owner.  Physical and cyber security 
controls in leased buildings on campus are not mandated by 
XYZ and may be less rigorous.  No cyber intrusions have yet 
interfered with cyber-physical systems in the leased building's 
network.  However, there have been reports of research systems 
attached to one leased building's network being exposed to cyber 
attack.  Although these buildings may control HVAC for large 
XYZ operational computing systems, because XYZ does not 
manage their networks, it considers them untrusted facilities and 
does not allow any physical connection between the leased 
buildings’ networks and the XYZ facilities network. 
III. APPROACH TO A SOLUTION 
We interviewed OT operations personnel, cyber defenders, 
and researchers who work with cyber-physical systems to 
understand the security needs in this space.  We sought to 
understand whether cyber incidents had ever been known to 
cause problems in a cyber-physical system and the proximate 
causes of any such incidents.  In this section, we will examine 
the findings of our interviews from three perspectives: the 
owner/operators of physical systems that have become cyber-
physical systems, the cyber defenders, and the researchers. 
A. Physical Systems (OT) Perspective 
We interviewed building managers, physical plant operators, 
and control-systems engineers to understand their perspective on 
how to improve the security of cyber-physical systems.  For 
most of the half century IT has existed, IT and OT groups have 
not had much reason to interact.  Frequently, IT groups are 
unfamiliar with the function of OT systems and have little 
interest in them.  From the OT side, as long as there was no 
credible threat from the network, OT staff saw no reason to open 
regular dialogue with cyber defenders.  Nobody on the OT side 
watches the operational cyber side on a day-to-day basis.  OT 
staff are frequently unaware of the tools techniques and 
procedures used to secure the IT networks.  OT staff are not part 
of the discussion when cyber security policy is changed and little 
thought is given to understanding how changes affects the cyber-
physical systems in control systems networks.  This means that 
policies, updates, and procedures that could be of security 
benefit may not be applied to the standard IT systems (like 
Windows servers) operating within the OT facilities network.  
Although both sides believe dialogue would be beneficial, no 
formal arrangement exists at XYZ Corp. yet.     
When OT staff or researchers at XYZ add a new TCP/IP ca-
pable device, IT cyber security personnel must be notified. But 
otherwise, each team is a black box to the other.  As IT and OT 
systems have converged, and many cyber-physical devices 
became web-based, there is growing interest and pressure to 
collaborate. 
The OT staff would find it useful to know what cyber threats 
are being aimed at their systems.  They want to understand what 
kind of attacks have happened in the past so they can learn 
lessons and understand potential risks.  The expectation is that if 
an anomalous cyber event happens directed at OT systems, the 
IT cybersecurity staff would notify the OT staff.  The 
cybersecurity staff at XYZ do not yet regularly provide threat 
information to OT staff, but they do monitor the average traffic 
destined for each cyber-physical device.  They send a list of IP 
addresses and amounts of traffic to OT operators weekly.  OT 
staff review this list to see if there are dramatic (>10% to 20%) 
changes.  Most of the anomalies they discover in this way arise 
from researchers making changes to their data-collection 
devices residing in the OT network.  Occasionally, a 
misconfigured device is discovered in this way.  
OT staff we interviewed related several classes of threat re-
lated to cyber attack and outlined their potential consequences. 
This information is shown in TABLE I.  
TABLE I.  THREATS OF CONCERN TO XYZ'S OT STAFF 
Threat Consequence 
Unauthorized access Loss of accountability and control; down 
time; equipment damage 
Loss or manipulation of 
data 
Intellectual property loss, scientific progress 
hampered, system malfunction 
Laboratory vent hoods or 
safety systems taken 
offline by an attack 
Injury or loss of life; deleterious physical 
effects; release of potentially harmful or 
deadly gasses 
Server room chillers 
degraded or offline 
Computer systems could sustain significant 
damage 
Negative pressure facilities 
compromised 
Chemical, biological, and radioactive 
contamination of environment and staff 
Overpressurization of 
water lines 
Physical damage; monetary loss 
Uninterruptible power 
supply compromise 
Inability to bring computer systems down in 
an orderly fashion in an emergency 
Alteration of set points in 
critical HVAC systems 
Damage, degradation, or loss of computer 
systems 
 
B. Cyber Security Perspective 
We interviewed several cyber security professionals at XYZ 
who are familiar with cyber-physical systems and the unique 
defensive challenges they represent.  We noted that cyber 
security staff also lament the lack of communication with OT 
staff.  There is no organizationally prioritized channel of formal 
communication between the IT and OT teams.  Problems on the 
OT side are seldom if ever reported to cyber staff.  Cyber 
security personnel pass warnings on to OT personnel but they 
suspect OT staff may not understand or act upon the warnings 
effectively.  Cyber analysts believe that OT staff who find 
malware on their systems will simply remove the malware files 
and reboot the systems without considering how to prevent 
future infections.  Many OT systems have no possibility of host-
based protection. 
Cyber analysts know which IP address ranges generally 
belong to cyber-physical systems, but only the OT staff 
understand the protocols, capabilities, and proper function of 
control systems.  Cyber analysts often do not understand the 
underlying physical system well enough to act or notify the 
system owners of something suspicious. Cyber analysts 
frequently cannot even be certain whether these systems need to 
be patched because active scanning frequently causes failures. 
An infamous incident at XYZ Corp. happened when cyber as-
sessors tried to scan an IT network that, unknown to them, was 
connected to an OT network.  When they started a Nessus scan, 
it activated sprinklers in a server room causing millions of dol-
lars in damage.   
Lack of visibility into the proper workings of cyber-physical 
systems is the gravest concern of cyber analysts.  The threat and 
business risk are not even roughly quantified for what would 
happen if a given CPS failed in specific ways.  Existing security 
plans instead focus on documenting connectivity and 
quantifying risk from a purely IT perspective. 
Although most OT systems are listed as noncritical, most 
cyber staff recognize that failures in the physical plant could be 
exceptionally costly.  Although this would tend to make one 
consider these systems high-value assets, cyber security staff are 
already tasked with more priorities than can be addressed.  
Listing them as critical would not help unless more resources 
were available to handle the workload [7].  Thus, these systems 
remain listed as non-critical. 
C. Research Perspective 
PNNL has developed several tools for monitoring cyber-
physical infrastructure to improve performance and security.  
Among them, we cover two that will serve as data sources for 
our proposed solution: VOLTTRON™ and SerialTap. 
1) VOLTTRON™ 
VOLTTRON™ is an open-source, secure, extensible, and 
modular building-management technology that enables mobile 
and stationary software agents to perform information gathering, 
processing, and control actions.  VOLTTRON can 
independently manage a wide range of applications, such as 
HVAC systems, electric vehicles, distributed energy or whole-
building loads, leading to improved operational efficiency and 
energy and cost savings. Our researchers have gained 
permission to place VOLTTRON data-collection agents on 
XYZ’s facilities network and on the networks of its leased 
buildings and remote facilities (Fig. 2).  Each instance forwards 
data to the XYZ corporate network via a special access agent 
located in the XYZ network DMZ.  There are 12 VOLTTRON 
servers running in each of 12 buildings.  Instances of 
VOLTTRON communicate via VOLTTRON Information 
Protocol (VIP), a message passing protocol based on ZeroMQ 
(http://zeromq.org).  Building systems data from VOLTTRON 
agents is made available to researchers for energy-related 
objectives and also for advanced cyber detection research in 
cyber-physical systems.   
No outbound access is available directly from sensors.  
Instead they forward data to the “Management Central” 
VOLTTRON instance in the XYZ network. Commands may be 
sent to the building management system (BMS) on the facilities 
network from authorized devices only.  The BMS commands 
these OT systems via field bus protocols tunneled under IP.  The 
12 VOLTTRON systems on the facilities network query the 
BMS to obtain their information.  These systems relay status 
information to the VOLTTRON Management Central system.  
XYZ OT data is made available to certain external collaborators 
via the VOLTTRON Passthrough instance in the XYZ DMZ.  
Other access to this information is available via a web portal that 
passes through a traffic scanner for security. 
  
Fig. 2. Architecture of building-controls sensors at XYZ. 
Although there has never been an OT fault that was known 
to be correlated with a cyber incident, it is quite possible to self-
induce a denial of service by doing too many simultaneous 
queries on the VOLTTRON instances because these in-turn 
query the sensors causing them to do extra work.  This happened 
once when researchers were setting up a demonstration 
simultaneously showing all the information that can be gained 
from the many VOLTTRON sensors.  If attackers could subvert 
a VOLTTRON node they could gain read-only access to see 
field bus protocol commands.  While this may facilitate an 
attacker's reconnaissance during the discovery and control 
phases, VOLTTRON would be much harder to subvert than 
most components on the facilities network because it is security 
hardened. 
2) SerialTap 
SerialTap is another PNNL tool that enables enterprise cyber 
security tools to monitor communications on serial field busses 
by tapping into the serial bus and tunneling the traffic it finds 
there via Ethernet packets to the enterprise LAN for analysis by 
cyber analysts and their tools.  The visibility VOLTTRON 
provides to OT TCP/IP networks SerialTap affords for serial 
networks with physical media like RS-232 cabling. SerialTap is 
designed to fail closed to avoid obstructing communications if 
the SerialTap device fails.  SerialTap is very inexpensive so that 
it could be placed on multiple network segments economically. 
The cost of segment-wise monitoring depends on the 
topology of the field bus.  In a bus topology, a single monitor 
anywhere on the bus can see the traffic from the entire segment 
because all traffic is broadcasted to every node.  In contrast, star 
topologies have only point-to-point serial connections between 
the PLC/RTU and each controlled/monitored device, so 
monitors must be placed inline as pass-throughs on each spoke 
of the network.  Ring topologies are also sometimes used, and, 
depending on the protocols used, every station on the ring may 
still see every command.  But if each device consumes the 
commands sent to it, pass-through monitors must be placed at 
every network segment to capture traffic.  The more monitors 
required, the greater the expense of implementation. 
SerialTap and VOLTTRON can provide important sources 
of OT data to the cyber analyst and enable better situational 
awareness decision support.  Additionally, they will expose 
hidden attacks and allow preservation of transient data that may 
contain clues about an intruder's purpose and methods. 
D. Lessons learned from the interviews 
From our interviews of staff on both sides it seems each 
group has competence in its own area but fears that the other 
group does not have sufficient competence in that area to help.  
On the physical side staff care about availability of services 
without concern for failure analysis.  From the cyber security 
side, root-cause analysis is critical to prevent reoccurrence of the 
same failure. 
A major problem in XYZ Corp. and elsewhere is the lack of 
communication between IT/cyber and OT/physical subject 
matter experts.  In most organizations, it would be unusual for 
the IT and OT groups to meet regularly.  The two groups have 
operational specialties and vocabularies that differ significantly, 
and communication is often ad hoc.  OT devices are complex, 
not well understood, and insufficiently monitored for security.  
Ideally IT and OT staff would always be aware of the issues on 
OT networks: cyber threats, performance benchmarks, noisy or 
malfunctioning devices, etc.  OT staff should communicate 
these issues back to IT, and IT staff must learn to communicate 
clearly to the OT operators. 
While analysts typically want to have all the data, all cyber 
defenders really need to know about OT systems is the degree 
of anomaly they are experiencing.  This would require collection 
of data on the OT networks using something like 
SerialTap/VOLTTRON and requires automatic data analysis to 
determine quickly the level of anomaly and potential threat.  
Employing these technologies on the OT networks allows 
operators to query the status of the system and intervene directly 
where necessary, bringing nearly as much visibility to the OT 
side as is available to cyber defenders on the IT side. 
The gap identified by our interviews outlines the shape of a 
communications tool to enable both cyber security analysts and 
control systems operators to react in near real time to cyber 
attack.  Additionally, the tool would act as a general 
communication solution between the two groups.  The reason 
such a tool does not yet exist is that both cyber and OT data are 
difficult to gather in one place for analysis and analysis. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The problems to be solved are lack of collaboration between IT 
and OT staff and difficulty understanding the state of the cyber-
physical infrastructure as a whole. To solve the first problem, we 
propose a visual interface that could be used equally well by 
both groups as a conversation starter. This visualization would 
be driven by the solution to the second problem: a data-driven 
deep-learning model that ingests cyber-physical data from the 
enterprise and correlates performance impact to prior suspicious 
cyber activity.  The proposed model will learn a representation 
of normal behavior, evaluate variations and excursions from au-
tomatically discovered normal operating bounds, and present 
them using the visualization.  The technology is designed to 
recognize distributed threats across the interwoven layers of 
OT/IT architecture over long time periods and provide 
measurable improvement to current state-of-the-art technologies 
for OT/IT intrusion detection. 
A. Visualization Prototype 
The visualization prototype is designed to present the degree 
of anomaly in OT systems in a way that is easily understandable 
to both cyber analysts and to control systems operators. The 
visualization will help human analysts to communicate and to 
locate the most anomalous parts of the system to prioritize 
investigate at a high level. The cyber analyst only needs to know 
how anomalous the cyber-physical system is, not what exactly 
is wrong with it. For the control systems specialist, the level of 
anomaly shown will indicate that further investigation is needed. 
The resulting trend visualization concept (Fig. 3) reduces the 
anomaly measure of an entire system to a set of bars that each 
represent a dimension of abnormality and whether it is increas-
ing or decreasing.  
  
Fig. 3. CyPhyEye anomaly visualization concept based on the SEQUESTOR 
concept. 
Each bar indicates the composite anomaly level of a single 
cyber-physical system, such as an instrument. Solid bars 
indicate the actual level of anomaly, while thinner lines 
represent the expected near future based on the observed rate of 
change. Arrows on the ends of the thin lines indicate the 
observed change velocity. Bar color indicates the raw level of 
anomaly concern for each system, and vertical lines represent 
the stage of action required.  
A further visualization concept (Fig. 4) shows the relative 
amounts of message traffic that system components send and 
receive. The network visualization concept presents a physical 
map of the facility or area of operation with two circles for each 
communicating entity. The size of the solid circle represents the 
amount of sent traffic and the outline circle represents the 
amount of received traffic. The point-to-point connectors also 
show the relative amounts of traffic sent and received.  
 
Fig. 4. CyPhyEye geographical communication visualization concept. 
A final visualization concept for the user experience is the 
pathway visualization (Fig. 5). When a user selects a node on 
the communication visualization or a bar on the anomaly 
visualization, he or she may drill down to the pathway 
visualization, which shows the communication partners of a 
given cyber-physical system component and the relative amount 
of communication for each. Analysts may annotate the 
component with notes about its behavior, etc. This visualization 
will help both OT and IT analysts understand the 
communication patterns within the control system and isolate 
potential problems related to network traffic, errors, etc. 
 
Fig. 5. Pathway visualization. 
B. Analytics Prototype 
The anomaly metrics required by the visualization approach 
must be derived computationally in real time. We propose a 
deep-learning-based approach that can handle the massive 
streams of data from OT systems and alerts that cyber tools 
produce and rapidly identify what is normal and how anomalous 
event streams are. 
Two kinds of communications data are available fro estima-
tion of anomaly in OT systems: (1) communications within the 
field bus and (2) communications between field bus devices and 
external networks. Both sources provide an indication of the 
anomaly level of the OT systems. We plan to create three deep 
learning neural networks to monitor and control the OT system 
(Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Deep learning system to monitor anomaly levels in OT networks. 
The first network will process network flow data and Snort 
alerts in the IT network, specifically looking for flows that con-
tain OT protocols. This recurrent neural network (RNN) log 
classifier will be patterned on the work of [8], which makes 
heavy use of long short-term memory (LSTM) [9] deep neural 
network connected in series and analysis of textual log entries 
as both tokenized word vectors and character vectors. Their 
work is an unsupervised approach to detecting anomalous be-
havior in computer and network logs that is largely domain-ag-
nostic. The model treats system logs as threads of interleaved 
“sentences” (event log lines) to train online unsupervised neural 
network language models using standard and bidirectional 
RNNs over network log data. They have created a tiered recur-
rent architecture, which provides context by modeling se-
quences of actions over time. The model has produced superior 
performance and fine-grained anomaly detection on open vo-
cabulary logging sources. analytics engine was architected to 
compute anomaly metrics from field bus transactions, which are 
cyclic and repetitive, consisting of simple transactions. The net-
work would be trained to classify network transactions as either 
low or high risk, initially based on their similarity to alerts from 
Snort, but later based on feedback from the other components. 
Additionally, this component produces a stream of network con-
text data that contains flows that involve systems within the OT 
system being monitored. 
The second component is planned to be a deep reinforcement 
learning (DRL) network whose job is to learn how to control the 
OT network in a manner similar to a BMS or NAC. This ICS 
DRL controller has an action set of enabling or disabling com-
mand/status information to/from the field bus, and its rewards 
come from producing the least anomalous behavior from the OT 
system. Essentially, this system consists of an autoencoder 
trained on stable field bus behaviors. The inputs to the model are 
the status messages on the field bus (the feedback), the high-risk 
behaviors detected by the first component, and the network con-
text it provides. It produces control streams for the components 
of the field bus and a behavioral anomaly metric. The greater the 
distance metric between the feedback and the autoencoded re-
sults, the higher the behavioral anomaly metrics is produced.  
The third component is planned to be another DRL network 
that takes the output of the RNN Log Classifier and the behav-
ioral anomaly score from the ICS DRL controller and decides 
whether firewall rules should be adjusted to temporarily quaran-
tine access between OT systems and the rest of the network. This 
approach is based on our prior work in [10]. The behavioral 
anomaly score forms the basis for the reward function for the 
DRL component. Additionally, over time, there will be an in-
creasing reward for re-opening communication. We assume that 
allowed communication pathways are at least generally desira-
ble, even if they sometimes produce undesirable results.  
The behavioral anomaly metric, the raw flow and Snort data, 
and the classifications derived by the deep learning system will 
feed the visualization and enable humans to work together to 
maintain cyber safety in OT neworks.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Concern over cyber-attacks has led to the thoughtless 
proliferation of tools focused on addressing pressing cyber-
security needs in OT systems without long-term consideration 
of their utility.  Much of what has been developed originates in 
the IT sector and has been inherited with little customization by 
the control systems world.  As a result, control-systems 
professionals, who have not been traditionally responsible for 
security, now have a role in cyber security of computerized OT 
systems, and they lack tools customized to their environment.  
The data deluge presents difficulty while not solving the essen-
tial problem of lack of communication between IT and OT. 
We have proposed a toolset that would perform much of the 
required analysis for the user and present only relevant 
information in a consistent way.  The proposed situational 
awareness toolset will fuse information from ICS with cyber 
security data and present a common visualization.  It will enable 
cross validation of automated warnings and enhance the quality 
of information that is presented to both IT and OT defenders 
through correlation of multiple data sources. 
We plan to take these and other concepts back to the 
operators who helped us understand their needs to see how well 
the concept would work. Because the concept is driven by data 
that is available only in limited quantity in current systems, we 
plan to work with building owners and use our installed base of 
sensors to obtain the needed data to train our prototype.  
Full definition of the architectures of the deep learning ele-
ments remains the largest area of future work. Given the data 
sources available and our access to both cyber security and OT 
operators we plan to use user-centric design methods to produce 
a usable prototype. Success of the prototype will be measured 
by how well defenders and operators are able to monitor and 
control their systems with and without our designs. We plan fu-
ture papers to report on our findings. 
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